Price and capacity competition in balancing markets with energy storage by Taylor, Josh A. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
50
3.
06
85
1v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
 Ju
l 2
01
5
Price and capacity competition in balancing markets
with energy storage
Joshua A. Taylor∗, Johanna L. Mathieu†, Duncan S. Callaway‡,
and Kameshwar Poolla§
October 10, 2018
Abstract
Energy storage can absorb variability from the rising number of wind and solar
power producers. Storage is different from the conventional generators that have tradi-
tionally balanced supply and demand on fast time scales due to its hard energy capacity
constraints, dynamic coupling, and low marginal costs. These differences are leading
system operators to propose new mechanisms for enabling storage to participate in
reserve and real-time energy markets. The persistence of market power and gaming in
electricity markets suggests that these changes will expose new vulnerabilities.
We develop a new model of strategic behavior among storages in energy balancing
markets. Our model is a two-stage game that generalizes a classic model of capac-
ity followed by Bertrand-Edgeworth price competition by explicitly modeling storage
dynamics and uncertainty in the pricing stage. By applying the model to balanc-
ing markets with storage, we are able to compare capacity and energy-based pricing
schemes and to analyze the dynamic effects of the market horizon and energy losses
due to leakage. Our first key finding is that capacity pricing leads to higher prices
and higher capacity commitments, and that energy pricing leads to lower, randomized
prices and lower capacity commitments. Second, we find that a longer market horizon
and higher physical efficiencies lead to lower prices by inducing the storage to compete
to have their states of charge cycled more frequently.
1 Introduction
High penetrations of variable renewable energy resources, such as wind and solar, call for
additional regulation and load following capabilities to maintain system reliability under
increased forecast errors [40, 31, 46]. Energy storage and demand response are widely con-
sidered promising solutions to renewable variability [6, 17, 16, 18]. To facilitate increased
procurement and utilization of these resources, Independent System Operators (ISOs) have
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begun to propose new mechanisms enabling storage to participate in reserve and real-time
energy markets, for example in California [14], Texas [7], and New York [3]. In this paper,
we refer to reserve and real-time energy markets as balancing markets.
A variety of storage technologies are now available to power systems, such as pumped
hydro, batteries, and flywheels [33, 18]. Load aggregations that actively participate in power
system operations through load shifting programs can also be approximated as virtual en-
ergy storage [41, 42]. We will henceforth refer to both physical energy storage and active
load aggregations simply as storage. All types of storage share the following first-order
characteristics:
• hard energy capacity constraints,
• dynamic coupling of energy states, and
• low marginal costs.
The hard energy capacity constraints arise from the physical limitations of each technology,
e.g., reservoir size and flywheel material strength. These constraints couple the range of
possible energy exchanges in one time period to the amount injected or extracted in the
preceding periods. Since storage does not use fuel, its costs are limited to operation, main-
tenance, and initial procurement, resulting in low marginal costs [47, 50, 4]. These features
distinguish storage from conventional generators. We discuss our modeling of storage and
markets in detail in Section 2.
The increasing role and distinct characteristics of storage are changing the physical and
economic nature of power systems. As electricity markets are modified to accommodate
storage, new vulnerabilities to market power and gaming will surface. Indeed, the persistence
of events like the California Electricity Crisis [34] and the more recent market manipulation
by J. P. Morgan [26] indicates that system operators must always be alert for strategic
behavior. Based on its past successes in diagnosing market power in existing electricity
markets, we believe game theory is a natural approach to assessing the vulnerabilities and
guiding the design of new balancing markets with energy storage participants. A notable
recent effort is [48], which analyzes strategic behavior when storage arbitrages energy between
on- and off-peak times.
In this paper, we focus on storage whose purpose is to preserve system stability by pro-
viding reserves and regulation in balancing markets. Our main contributions are a new
game-theoretic model of strategic behavior that captures the three aforementioned stor-
age characteristics, and concrete design insights obtained from its application to balancing
markets. Our proposed model is an extension of capacity followed by price competition, a
two-stage game in which Bertrand-Edgeworth price competition is preceded by a capacity-
setting stage [38, 1]. Bertrand-Edgeworth competition [8, 24, 53] is a special case of supply
function competition [36], which has been widely applied to electricity markets because it
captures generators’ nonlinear fuel curves [10, 30, 22, 5]. Standard Bertrand-Edgeworth
competition is similarly well-suited to modeling storage because it captures its hard capacity
constraint and low marginal costs.
In Section 3.1, we develop an extension of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition in the duopoly
case using the theoretical approach of [1] (which considers a deterministic demand in a sin-
gle time period). Our extension is theoretically novel in its description of random energy
imbalances, multiple time periods, and the dynamic coupling of storage’s energy states. The
resulting generalization of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition is still far more analytically
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tractable than general supply function competition in that it admits a complete charac-
terization of the pricing equilibrium. Using the pricing equilibrium characterization, we
subsequently develop a novel characterization of the scenario where storage first commits a
capacity that then parametrizes the ensuing pricing game. All proofs are collected in the
appendix.
In Section 4, we apply our results on price and capacity competition to balancing markets
and obtain several new insights. We first use price competition to analyze the dynamic effects
of market horizon and losses due to energy leakage. We find that if the market horizon is
large and leakage small enough, firms will compete to be cycled more frequently by reducing
their prices, hence improving economic competitiveness. We then use capacity competition
to compare markets in which firms are paid for capacity (as in traditional reserve markets)
and for energy (as in traditional real-time energy markets). Our results show that, similar to
what has been observed in generation markets [43, 20], firms commit more capacity and set
higher prices under capacity pricing and commit less capacity and set lower, random prices
under energy pricing. In Section 5, we state our design insights for energy balancing markets
with storage and identify some future research directions.
2 Storage in balancing markets
In this section, we describe our model of storage and the role of storage in balancing markets.
2.1 Physical modeling
We employ the following generic storage model (see, e.g., [51]). Let Sti be firm i’s stored
energy at time t, also known as the state of charge, and let X ti be the energy added or
removed from the storage at time t. Between time periods, a fraction of the state of charge,
1 − αi ∈ [0, 1], is dissipated, which we refer to as leakage. The state of charge of storage i
then evolves according to the difference equation
St+1i = αiS
t
i +X
t
i .
The state of charge must remain within the hard capacity limit 0 ≤ Sti ≤ Si, where Si is
the maximum amount of energy that can be stored. Here we have neglected injection and
extraction losses for modeling tractability; we heuristically let leakage act as a proxy for
these inefficiencies because all have the effect of dissipating energy and hence reducing the
state of charge.
We also neglect constraints on X ti (analogous to a generator’s power constraint) and the
derivative of X ti (analogous to a generator’s ramp constraint) to maintain the tractability of
our model. Ignoring power constraints is valid for storage technologies with high power and
low energy capacities like flywheels and superconducting magnetic energy storage [33], which
are most appropriate for the balancing markets we consider. Ignoring ramp constraints is
justified because storage is generally able to ramp quickly. For comparison, coal, nuclear,
and steam turbines can change their power output at 1–5% per minute, and gas turbines and
diesel generators can ramp at 5–40% per minute [52]. In contrast, a pumped hydro storage
facility in Wales, UK can move from zero to full output in less than 16 seconds [27], and
newer technologies like grid-level batteries and flywheels can respond even faster [33, 18].
In our balancing market model, an energy imbalance Bt is realized in each time period.
The objective of the system operator is to eliminate the imbalance by apportioning it over
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a group of storages; this objective contrasts other uses of storage like load-shifting, in which
useful energy is moved in time to achieve greater efficiency [18]. The portion of Bt that
can be allocated to a particular storage is limited by its state of charge if Bt < 0 and its
unused capacity, Si − S
t
i , if B
t > 0. A participating storage can be paid for the capacity
it commits to the balancing market, Si, or for the imbalances it absorbs, X
t
i . In the latter
case, storage is paid a positive amount for canceling imbalances regardless of whether Bt
is positive or negative. This is realistic because both positive and negative imbalances are
undesirable. For instance, both can result from renewable intermittency or faults and both
can cause frequency instability [39, 54]. Also, the mileage payments some system operators
have implemented in response to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Order #755
are similarly based on a price times an absolute value, albeit for ramping rather than energy
or power [15].
In the special case in which there is one time period and B is deterministic, we interpret
B as a demand for storage capacity. We make use of this special case in Section 4.2 in
comparing energy-based and capacity-based payment schemes.
Because storage does not have a fuel source, its only costs are associated with operation,
maintenance, and initial procurement. Over long periods of time, these are small relative to
the fuel costs incurred by generators [47, 50, 4]. For this reason and for concision, we model
storage as having zero marginal costs associated with energy injections and extractions.
Consequently, all prices higher than what would be necessary to recoup opportunity costs
in our subsequent model are the result of gaming, which may be interpreted as undesirable
additions ‘superimposed’ on top of marginal cost prices from a non-strategic (e.g., welfare
maximizing) model. In this regard, our approach is intended to isolate strategic behaviors,
and does not account for other intended revenue streams of storage.
Storage can provide a handful of services besides balancing such as load-shifting, contin-
gency reserves, and voltage regulation [32, 49, 18]. Here, we only consider its participation
in balancing markets, and model the foregone profits from providing other services as the
opportunity cost −γiSi, where γi ≥ 0 is a known parameter and Si is the capacity committed
to the balancing market. Because storage cannot sell power in baseload energy markets
(because it must first take in all energy that it provides), these opportunities costs may be
substantially lower than those of generators participating in reserve markets [54, 55].
2.2 Market modeling
As discussed in Section 1, balancing markets match supply with demand on faster time scales
than baseload energy markets. For example, many ISOs operate real-time energy markets
that balance supply and demand every five minutes, and also operate frequency regulation
markets that procure capacity to balance supply and demand on timescales of seconds. If
the associated baseload energy market is well designed, the imbalances in balancing markets
should average to zero over time. Moreover, ISOs have proposed mechanisms to ensure
imbalances average to zero over specific time intervals to enable participation of energy
constrained resources like storage [14, 7, 3].
We consider a hypothetical balancing market in which each storage first commits a ca-
pacity, Si, and then sets a price, pi, which, depending on the market format, can be for
energy or capacity. Our model assumes firms are paid the price they bid rather than all
firms seeing the same price, which is also referred to as a discriminatory price auction. The
merits of discriminatory versus uniform price auctions in power markets have been analyzed
extensively, cf. [35, 37, 25], but no consensus on which format is superior has emerged.
In each time period, the system wide energy imbalance Bt, which we assume to be
random, is allocated price-wise among the storages up to the their capacities. When pi is
an energy price, it persists over a sequence of time periods. This represents the realistic
scenario that imbalances are realized and physically responded to faster than the duration
between markets, e.g., every few seconds; we describe this in detail in the next section. This
setup is similar to the California Independent System Operator’s (CAISO) real-time energy
market [13], as discussed in Section 4.2. Note that even if the energy imbalances exceed the
combined storage capacity, there is virtually always sufficient generator reserves, which here
we model simply as a more expensive storage with infinite capacity.
We remark that setting capacities prior to prices is an important difference between
our setup and those used by some ISOs, wherein capacities and prices are bid simultane-
ously. Some theoretical results are given by [1], which finds that simultaneous bidding under
deterministic demand never leads to pure strategy Nash equilibria. Further discussion on
two-dimensional bidding in electricity markets is given by [12, 19]. We justify our mod-
eling both as more tractable approximation to the case of simultaneous bidding, and as a
potentially realistic model in its own right. In particular, system operators often require
capacity information earlier than price information, as is the case with CAISO’s residual
unit commitment [13]. In a balancing market with storage, for instance, a system operator
may require a capacity commitment every few hours, but allow firms to update their prices
to reflect current conditions on shorter intervals.
3 Price and capacity competition
In this section, we develop tools for analyzing balancing markets with storage. First, we
generalize Bertrand-Edgeworth price competition so that a single price bid determines the
demand allocations for multiple dynamically coupled periods. We completely characterize
the Nash equilibrium of this game by building on theoretical techniques from [1]. Subse-
quently, we obtain new results for Nash equilibria when firms strategically set capacities prior
to the price-setting stage when the demand is random. We primarily focus on duopolies for
analytical tractability. All proofs are collected in the Appendix.
Throughout this section, we refer to the quantity B as the sequence of imbalances. We
examine special cases of the general framework in Section 4, where we identify B either as
a sequence of energy imbalances to be allocated amongst the storages or as a demand for
(deterministic) storage capacity.
3.1 Price-setting stage
We define our model for price-setting and how the resulting prices determine the allocation
of random imbalances among the firms in Section 3.1.1. In Section 3.1.2, we obtain the
explicit mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for this game. We assume here that the firms have
fixed capacities Si, i = 1, ..., N . Later in Section 3.2, the capacities themselves become the
firms’ strategic decisions, and the resulting payoff depends on the price equilibrium obtained
in this section.
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3.1.1 Imbalance allocation and payoff rules.
Each firm sets a price, pi ≥ 0, which persists through all time periods, t = 0, ..., T . We refer
to T as the market horizon. Between periods, firm i leaks a constant fraction of its state of
charge, 1−αi ∈ [0, 1]. In each period t, the system operator observes the random imbalances
Bt ∈ R, but is not aware of future demands. We assume that the sequence of imbalances
are statistically described by the joint distribution f(B). The case when B is not random is
simply when f(B) is a discrete distribution with its entire mass on one point.
In each period t, the imbalance Bt ∈ R is allocated amongst the firms according to the
below linear program, which is parametrized by the price vector p.
minimize
Xt
1
,...,Xt
N
N+1∑
i=1
pi
∣∣X ti ∣∣ (1)
such that
N+1∑
i=1
X ti = B
t (2)
0 ≤ αiS
t
i(p) +X
t
i ≤ Si, i = 1, ..., N (3)
Here, the storages are dispatched in merit order, i.e., the storage with the lowest price is used
up to its capacity, then that with the second lowest, and so on until Bt has been completely
allocated in each time period. X ti is the portion of B
t allocated to firm i, and Sti(p) its state
of charge in period t. We display the dependence of the allocation on the price vector p by
denoting X ti (p) = X
t
i .
Observe that (1)-(3) allocates the imbalance in a given time period with no regard to
future imbalances. This assumption is appropriate for our current scope because future
imbalances are random and hence unknown to the system operator. Note that the system
operator could achieve better performance by utilizing the statistics of future imbalances, i.e.,
f(B), in its allocation decisions; unfortunately, this would make our model intractable. On
the other hand, we could tractably model the simultaneous allocation of the entire sequence
B1, ..., BT , but this would unrealistically assume that the system operator can perfectly
predict all future imbalances.
Firm i’s state of charge evolves according to
St+1i (p) = αiS
t
i (p) + X
t
i (p), S
0
i (p) = S
0
i . (4)
Firm i’s total realized profit after the pricing game is then
pi
T∑
t=0
∣∣X ti (p)∣∣ .
Note that this payment implies that firms are paid identically for positive and negative
imbalances. As discussed in Section 2.1, this is a reasonable assumption because both positive
and negative imbalances are detrimental to system operation, e.g., both can lead to frequency
instability.
Firm N + 1 corresponds to conventional generator reserves, which cost pN+1 = R. We
assume the capacity of conventional reserves is much larger than the storage pool so that
SN+1 =∞. This implies that pi ≤ R if firm i is to receive any payment; for this reason, R is
sometimes referred to as the reservation utility. Under price ties, firms are randomly assigned
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priority, e.g., if pi = pj for some i 6= j, firm i receives first allocation with probability one
half. A variety of tie-rules could be specified that would serve equivalently in our analysis,
and the particular choice does not affect our results.
Let µi be firm i’s mixed strategy, which we assume to be independent of the other firms’
strategies. Let E denote the expectation over B throughout the paper. The payoff associated
with µi is
πi(µ) =
∫
p
(∏
j
µj(pj)
)
piE
[
T∑
t=0
∣∣X ti (p)∣∣
]
dp. (5)
µ is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if for each firm i, πi(µ) ≥ πi(µ
′
i, µ−i) for all µ
′
i. We
denote the payoff of a pure strategy πi(pi, µ−i). Note that this definition is essentially the
Bayesian equilibrium where B is the only unknown parameter and all firms share the same
knowledge [28, 44].
3.1.2 Price equilibrium.
In this section, we characterize the price equilibrium. Discontinuous games can fail to have
a (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium [21]. The next lemma guarantees that the pricing game
always has a mixed-strategy price equilibrium.
Lemma 1. A mixed-strategy price equilibrium always exists.
The below lemma gives the explicit, pure strategy equilibrium in two extreme cases.
Lemma 2. In the following two cases, the mixed strategy equilibrium reduces to a pure
strategy equilibrium.
1. If for each i, E
[∑T
t=0 |X
t
i (p)|
]
= 0 when i’s price is maximal (i = argmax
j
pj), the pure
strategy equilibrium is pi = 0 for all i.
2. If E
[∑T
t=0 |X
t
i (p)|
]
= E
[∑T
t=0 |X
t
i (p
′)|
]
> 0 for all i and all price vectors p and p′, the
pure strategy equilibrium is pi = R for all i.
In standard Bertrand-Edgeworth competition with one period and deterministic demand,
the first case reduces to the firms undercutting each other’s price to zero, and the second case
to the firms setting the maximum price because they are guaranteed that their capacity will
be exhausted. When the imbalance, B, is random, the first case entails that any realization
of B be containable by any size N −1 subset of the firms, and the latter that any realization
exhausts each firm’s capacity in every time stage.
The following lemma characterizes the mixed strategies in the general n-firm case.
Lemma 3. Let [Li, Ui] denote the support of firm i’s mixed strategy, µi(p).
1. For any firm j’s support, [Lj , Uj], there are at least two firms i for which µi(p) > 0 for
all p ∈ [Lj , Uj ].
2. Only one atom can exist across all firms, and if one does, it must be at U = maxi Ui.
3. U = R.
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We henceforth restrict our attention the more tractable two-firm case. Without loss of
generality, we assume that S1 ≥ S2. We use the notation [X ]
Z
Y to denote the quantity X
truncated below by Y and above by Z, i.e., [X ]ZY = min{max{X, Y }, Z}. Let X i be the
sum of the magnitudes of the imbalances captured by firm i when it has first priority in the
allocation of Bt in each period, and X i when it has second priority. Mathematically, let p
′
denote a price vector in which pi < p−i, and p
′′ vice versa. Then
X i = E
[
T∑
t=0
∣∣X ti (p′)∣∣
]
= E
[
T∑
t=0
∣∣∣[Bt]Si−Sti (p′)
−Sti (p
′)
∣∣∣
]
and
X i = E
[
T∑
t=0
∣∣X ti (p′′)∣∣
]
= E
[
T∑
t=0
∣∣∣∣[Bt − [Bt]S−i−St−i(p′′)−St
−i(p
′′)
]Si−Sti (p′′)
−Sti (p
′′)
∣∣∣∣
]
.
It is straightforward to show that X i ≥ X i, X 1 ≥ X 2, and X 1 ≥ X 2.
Note that X i and X i can be directly computed from each Si, αi and the distribution of
B. For example, when there is only one time period and S0i = 0, we have
X i =
∫ Si
0
Bf(B)dB + Si(1− F (Si)) (6)
X i =
∫ Si
0
Bf (B + S−i) dB + Si (1− F (S1 + S2)) (7)
When B is also not random,
X i = [B]
Si
0 (8)
X i =
[
B − [B]S−i0
]Si
0
(9)
The following new result explicitly characterizes the pricing equilibrium for general duopolies.
Theorem 1. Assume without loss of generality that S1 ≥ S2. The equilibrium payoffs are
given by
π∗1 = RX 1
π∗2 =
RX 1X 2
X 1
The mixed strategies are
µ1(x) =
RX 1X 2
X 1
(
X 2 − X 2
)
x2
+
X 2X 1 −X 2X 1
X 1
(
X 2 −X 2
) δ(x− R), x ∈ [L,R]
µ2(x) =
RX 1(
X 1 −X 1
)
x2
, x ∈ [L,R]
where δ(x) is the Dirac delta function and L = RX 1/X 1.
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Observe that the equilibrium in Theorem 1 is unique because our derivation constructively
identifies the properties an equilibrium must have. It is straightforward to show that the for
two firms Lemma 2 is a special case of Theorem 1 by considering two limiting cases. In the
first, X i = 0, π
∗
1 = π
∗
2 = 0, and each µi(x) has an atom of mass one at x = 0. In the latter,
X i = X i, π
∗
1 = RX 1, π
∗
2 = RX 2, and each mixed strategy has an atom of mass one at x = R.
3.2 Capacity-setting stage
We now turn to the strategic determination of storage capacities; recall that this decision
stage occurs prior to price-setting. For analytical tractability, we restrict our attention to a
single time period, and consider both the cases when B is deterministic and random. Since
there is no dynamic coupling over a single time period, we can assume B ≥ 0 and S0i = 0
for both firms without loss of generality. In these cases, the price equilibria are given by
(6)-(9) and Theorem 1. For tractability, we only seek pure strategy capacity equilibria, as is
standard in almost all supply function-based approaches, cf. [10, 30, 22, 5].
3.2.1 Capacity game
Prior to price setting, the firms choose capacities S1, S2 ≥ 0 to maximize expected profits.
Each firm incurs an opportunity cost as discussed in Section 2, −γiSi, which must satisfy
0 < γi ≤ R for the game to be nontrivial. The price equilibrium payoff of the larger firm
is denoted by π(Si, S−i) and of the smaller firm by π(Si, S−i), where Si ≥ S−i, i.e., the first
argument is the larger capacity. The expected net profit of firm i is the payoff from the
pricing stage minus the opportunity cost:
ψi(S) = −γiSi +
{
π (Si, S−i) if Si ≥ S−i
π (S−i, Si) if Si < S−i
The capacity game is defined by both firms simultaneously maximizing their respective
payoffs, ψ1(S) and ψ2(S). A capacity pair S is a Nash equilibrium if it satisfies the standard
definition:
ψi (S) ≥ ψi (S
′
i, S−i) ∀ S
′
i ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. (10)
3.2.2 Capacity equilibrium
The below result for the case that B is deterministic and its n-firm generalization are given
in [1].
Lemma 4. When B is deterministic, the set of capacity equilibria is given by the continuous
range of values described by
S1 + S2 = B,
R − γi
2R− γi
B ≤ Si ≤ S−i, i = 1, 2.
Observe here that the sum of the firms’ capacities exactly equals the total demand, B,
which, according to the first part of Lemma 2, means that at equilibrium both firms will set
their price at the maximum, R.
We now give a novel characterization of the capacity equilibrium when B is random and
nonnegative.
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Lemma 5. Suppose that that B is random and nonnegative and that f(B) is positive and
decreasing for B ≥ 0. Then π(Si, S−i) − γiSi and π(S−i, Si) − γiSi are respectively strictly
concave and strictly quasiconcave in Si.
Because the segments of ψi(S) where Si < S−i and Si > S−i are both quasiconcave and
differentiable in Si, pure strategy capacity equilibria are liable to occur where their derivatives
are zero, enabling us to obtain constructive characterizations. Note, however, that ψi(S) may
not be quasiconcave due to the kink where the two segments meet at Si = S−i, and in some
cases a pure strategy capacity equilibrium may not exist.
Let the cumulative distribution of B be given by F (B) =
∫ B
0
f(x)dx. Denote the inverse
cumulative distribution F−1(x), let F−1(0) = 0, and note that F−1(x) is well-defined for
x ∈ [0, 1) because f(B) > 0 for B ≥ 0. Define
Λ1i = F
−1(1− γi/R) (11)
Λ2i = Si such that
dπ (S−i, Si)
dSi
∣∣∣∣
S−i=Λ1−i−Si
= γi (12)
If Si ≥ S−i, setting the derivative of ψi (S) = π(S) − γiSi with respect to Si equal to zero
gives Si + S−i = Λ
1
i . If Si < S−i, setting the derivative of ψi (S) = π(S)− γiSi to zero gives
Si = Λ
2
i .
Define
Sˆi =
(
Λ1i − Λ
2
−i,Λ
2
−i
)
.
Sˆi is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if it satisfies the definition given by (10). Note that
we have not proven that Λ2i is uniquely defined, i.e., that there is a single solution to (12).
However, this is the case in all of our numerical examples in Section 4.2.
Lemma 6. Suppose that that B is random and nonnegative and that f(B) is positive and
decreasing. Then the Sˆi, i = 1, 2 are the only possible pure-strategy equilibria.
We base our analysis in Section 4.2 on Lemma 6 by only considering the equilibria Sˆi,
i = 1, 2. We remark that since ψi(S) is continuous, a mixed-strategy equilibrium must exist
even if both of the Sˆi fail to be equilibria [29]. In our subsequent analysis in Section 4.2, we
limit our attention to the above pure strategy equilibria, at least one of which always exists
in our examples in Section 4.2.
4 Analysis of electricity markets
In this section, we apply our results on price and capacity competition to energy imbalance
markets with storage. We first restrict our attention to markets with energy-based pricing
and examine the effect of market horizon and leakage. We then use capacity competition to
compare markets with capacity and energy-based payments. As discussed in Section 2, prices
and profits beyond that necessary to recoup opportunity costs in our model are the exclusive
result of strategic behavior. Hence, in this section we will equate better performance with
lower firm prices and profits.
Our application of price and capacity competition most closely parallels supply function
modeling of generator competition (see the introduction) in that here firms submit what is
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essentially a two-parameter bid curve consisting of a single price and a capacity limit. As
discussed in Section 2, the price and capacity competition framework is highly appropriate
for storage because it precisely captures its hard capacity limits, dynamic coupling, and
low operating costs while admitting more nuanced analyses than would be obtainable from
generally supply function competition.
4.1 Dynamic effects
In this section, we use the results of Section 3.1 to examine the dynamic effects of the market
horizon and physical efficiency (leakage) under energy-based pricing. Here we assume that
capacities are given, i.e., not set strategically in a prior stage. Note that although our
formulation can accommodate serial correlations in the sequence of energy imbalances, we
do not consider their effects for concision and because we regard market horizon and efficiency
to be more influential parameters.
4.1.1 Market horizon
We examine the effect of the market horizon, T , as defined in Section 3.1.1 on equilibria.
Note that this relationship can only be observed through energy pricing because the number
of periods does not (directly) affect firm profits under capacity payments. We look at the
expected equilibrium prices, which can be calculated analytically from Theorem 1 to be
ρ∗1 =
R
X 1
(
X 2 − X 2
) (X 1X 2
(
1 + ln
(
X 1
X 1
))
− X 2X 1
)
ρ∗2 =
RX 1
X 1 −X 1
ln
(
X 1
X 1
)
.
Figure 1 shows ρ∗1 and ρ
∗
2 as a function of the market horizon, T . The firm parameters
are S1 = 1.5 and S2 = 1 and α1 = α2 = 1. Each period’s energy imbalance is drawn from
an independent, zero mean Gaussian distribution with variance σ, where σ = 1/4 in the top
plot and σ = 4 in the bottom. Each plot shows the result for three different initial states
of charge, which we assume satisfy S01/S1 = S
0
2/S2. This assumption is consistent with
mechanisms used by system operators to ‘reset’ storage to ensure that imbalances average
to zero over time [14, 7, 3]. The integrals necessary to compute the equilibria were evaluated
numerically using 105 Monte Carlo points.
As is to be expected, regardless of initial condition the expected prices converge to the
same long-horizon value for each storage, which increases with σ. However, the initial con-
dition can lead to qualitatively different transient behaviors. When the firms begin empty
(S0 = 0), each ρ∗i monotonically increases with T . This is because the firms cannot capture
profits when the early imbalances are negative, and thus have a relatively high probability
of not exhausting their capacity, leading to undercutting. In numerical experiments, we
observed that this behavior only occurs when the initial state of charge is under a tenth the
total capacity (or within a tenth of full), and thus does not account for the majority of cases.
When the initial state of charge is between ten and ninety percent of the capacity, we
observe three different equilibrium regimes as T is increased:
1. (Small T ) In this range, each firm rarely hits its energy capacity limit before T . Con-
sequently, either firm can physically accommodate most of the demand, causing them
to engage in undercutting. This equilibrium is closer to the first case in Lemma 2.
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Figure 1: Expected equilibrium prices as a function of horizon, T , with the large firm solid
and the small firm dashed. The energy imbalance in each period has variance σ = 1/4 in
the top plot and σ = 4 in the bottom. Each plot depicts the cases when the initial states
of charge are zero, one quarter, and half their capacities (S0 = {0, S/4, S/2}), with thicker
lines indicating higher initial states of charge.
2. (Medium T ) As T is increased, firms are likely to have their capacities exhausted
exactly once regardless of their price. Consequently, firms set higher prices closer to
the reservation utility. This equilibrium is closer to the second case in Lemma 2.
3. (Large T ) Further increasing T causes the firms to enter a regime where the lower
priced firm cycles faster, i.e., hits its capacity limits more than the other, and hence
profits more. As a result, the firms resume undercutting. There is a ‘knee’ in the curve,
beyond which increasing T further contributes little to economic competitiveness.
In the top plot, the first regime appears within the first couple periods, the second
between three and seven periods, and the third past the seventh period. In the bottom
plot, only the latter two regimes are present, with the transition occurring around the third
period. The knee at which a larger market horizon does not significantly reduce firm profits
occurs around T = 20 in the top plot and T = 7 in the bottom. Generally, the location of
the knee can be expected to increase as a function of storage size and decrease as a function
of energy imbalance variance.
Market horizon is an important design parameter for balancing markets because too
large a horizon will make adapting to changes difficult and too short a horizon could add
price volatility. For the majority of initial conditions, the expected prices decrease with T .
Therefore, the market horizon should be chosen to be large enough that the expected prices
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have nearly converged to the long-horizon value. From Figure 1, we see that this convergence
occurs relatively early at the knee in each plot. Hence, our analysis enables the identification
of market horizons that are small but still minimize gaming.
4.1.2 Leakage
We now consider the effect of losses due to the leakage parameter, α, which was defined in
Section 2. Like the market horizon, leakage can only be analyzed in a dynamic setting because
it manifests between periods. As discussed in Section 2, we use leakage as an analytically
tractable proxy for general inefficiencies like injection and extraction losses, though we note
there are important differences between the two mechanisms; we leave detailed analysis of
the effects of inefficiency to future work.
We again study the expected equilibrium price, ρ∗i , for T = 100, which represents the
long-horizon value. The firms have capacities S1 = 1.5 and S2 = 1 with S
0
i = Si/2. Figure 2
shows ρ∗i as a function of α for σ = {1/10, 1, 10}, now with thicker lines corresponding to
larger variances.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
ρ
∗ i
α
Figure 2: Expected equilibrium price as a function of leakage. The three pairs of curves
correspond to the variances σ = {1/10, 1, 10}, with thicker lines corresponding to larger σ.
At the left side of the plot, the state of charge drops to zero at the end of each time
period, effectively resulting in a single period model. Consequently, at low variances, the
firms undercut intensely, and at high variances where capacity is expected to be exhausted,
the firms set prices near the reservation utility. We remark that inefficient storage is less
useful to power systems due to high energy waste, which is not penalized in our model. As
the physical efficiency improves, the prices increase in the lower variance cases, and then
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decrease just before reaching zero leakage. This transition from increasing to decreasing
prices occurs because the profit gain from cycling more frequently by being the lower priced
firm begins to outweigh the profits lost to leakage. On the other hand, in the high variance
case, the price decreases monotonically as the profit gains from cycling more frequently
overtake those of charging high prices in each individual period.
From a physical perspective, losses are always undesirable, and modern batteries can
achieve roundtrip efficiencies of over 70% [23] and up to 95% for technologies like supercon-
ducting magnetic energy storage [33, 18]. Therefore, focusing on the right side of the plot, we
conclude that lower leakage reduces gaming. More precisely, lower leakage strengthens the
state of charge’s dynamic coupling. This increases the value of being cycled more frequently
relative to setting a high price in each individual period, thus inducing the firms to lower
their prices. This conforms with the results of [51], which also finds through an inventory
control-based model that increased leakage reduces competition. Note that this is a similar
outcome to that achieved by increasing the market horizon.
4.2 Pricing capacity versus energy
Under capacity pricing, firms are paid for committed capacity in forward markets (FM).
Under energy pricing, firms are paid for absorbing energy imbalances in real-time markets
(RTM). The key mathematical difference between each format is that the system operator’s
capacity requirement is deterministic and energy imbalances are random. In this section,
we use the capacity competition results from Section 3.2 to compare these two formats.
Our analysis here is highly idealized because the results in Section 3.2 assume one stage of
competition, meaning that storages are competing to absorb a single energy imbalance.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the sequence of events under each type of pricing. In both
cases, firms first set their maximum capacities, Si, in the FM. Under capacity pricing, firms
then set prices for deterministic capacity (also known as ‘capacity premiums’) in the FM,
and the system operator purchases a portion of each firm’s capacity at these prices in the
FM. The equilibrium in this case is described by Lemma 4. Under energy pricing, firms set
prices for energy (also known as ‘imbalance fees’) in the FM, and firms are paid for absorbing
energy imbalances in the RTM. The equilibrium in this case is described by Lemma 6. While
some energy markets allow prices and capacities to be set in the RTM, our assumption is
consistent with markets like CAISO’s real-time (5-minute) energy market, in which capacities
and prices are set on the hour, and generators are dispatched price-wise every 5-minutes [13].
Table 1: Sequence of events under capacity pricing. The capacity equilibrium in this case is
described by Lemma 4.
Stage Time Description Competition
1 FM Firms set maximum capacities, Si. Capacity
2 FM Firms set capacity prices, pi. Price
3 FM Deterministic capacity requirement, B, allocated price-wise. –
We first compare the qualitative properties of the two formats described in Tables 1 and
2. Ascribing Lemma 4 to markets with capacity pricing, firms will declare capacities that
sum exactly to the total capacity requirement. Consequently, the price equilibrium reduces
to the second scenario in Lemma 2, which says that each firm’s pure strategy is to bid the
maximum price, p1 = p2 = R, the least economically competitive outcome. Moreover, there
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Table 2: Sequence of events under energy pricing. The capacity equilibrium in this case is
described by Lemma 6.
Stage Time Description Competition
1 FM Firms set maximum capacities, Si. Capacity
2 FM Firms set energy prices, pi. Price
3 RTM Random energy imbalance, B, allocated price-wise. –
is a potentially wide range of capacity equilibria, some of which may be inequitable to some
firms [1].
Energy-based markets are described by Lemma 6 on capacity equilibria when the demand
in the pricing stage is random. Under the conditions of the lemma, at most two pure-strategy
capacity equilibria can exist, but in some scenarios there may only be mixed equilibria. This
implies that firm capacity commitments are more predictable under energy pricing, and
is reminiscent of a central result of [36] showing that uncertainty reduces the number of
pure-strategy supply function equilibria. It is easy to see from Theorem 1 that the price
equilibrium is mixed and result in expected firm profits below pricing at the maximum.
Next, we numerically compare the capacity equilibria under capacity and energy pricing.
We assume that the real-time energy imbalance obeys the half-normal distribution f(B) =√
2/πe−B
2/2, B ≥ 0, because normal distributions have long been used to model mismatches
in supply and demand in power systems [9]. The system operator’s capacity requirement is
just the mean of B,
√
2/π; we comment more on this choice later. In both market formats,
the reservation utility, R, is based on the cost of generator reserves. Specifically, suppose
that x units of generator capacity costs r(x) = ax2 + bx. The reservation price for capacity
is then R1 = r(x)/x, and for expected reserve energy R2 = r(x)/E[min{B, x}]. If we assume
that all capacity will be procured from storage, i.e., x = 0, we have
R2 = lim
x→0
r(x)
E[min{B, x}]
= lim
x→0
2ax+ b
1− F (x)
by l’Hoˆpital’s rule
= lim
x→0
r(x)
x
= R1
Hence, we may assume that both formats have the same reservation utility. For simplicity,
we set R1 = R2 = 1.
Figure 3 shows the pure strategy equilibria under energy pricing. Two equilibria can
coexist, but only when the firms’ opportunity costs are similar, i.e., γ1 ≈ γ2. Otherwise, the
single equilibrium is Sˆi where γi < γ−i, which corresponds to the firm with the lower op-
portunity cost committing a higher capacity. The associated equilibrium profits correspond
to prices well below the reservation utility, R = 1; for instance, when γ1 ≈ γ2, the profits
are approximately one quarter the committed capacity, corresponding to average prices of
approximately 1/4.
Figure 4 shows the total profits and capacity commitment over the same range as Figure 3,
along with the deterministic capacity pricing case. Here, profits under capacity pricing are
substantially higher, even in the low opportunity cost regime where energy pricing leads to
greater capacity commitment. We remark that the system operator would typically procure
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Figure 3: Each storage’s equilibrium capacity and payoff for γ2 = 0.5. The two equilibria
are identical when γ1 = γ2 = 0.5.
far more than the mean,
√
2/π, so we regard the capacity commitment and profit under
capacity pricing to be a conservative approximation.
The salient differences between the formats are summarized below:
• Capacity pricing leads to larger capacity commitments and consistent (pure strategy),
high prices.
• Energy pricing leads to smaller capacity commitments and inconsistent (mixed strat-
egy), lower prices.
Except for the randomization of prices under energy pricing, these are well-known charac-
teristics in other markets (e.g., conventional energy and reserves), and reflect the tradeoff
between robust (capacity-based) approaches that guarantee adequate capacity and average
(energy-based) cost approaches that achieve better economic competitiveness (see, e.g., [43]
or [20]). To our knowledge, this is the first such analysis capturing this tradeoff in balancing
markets with storage.
5 Conclusion and future work
Energy storage and aggregations of shiftable loads could soon compete alongside traditional
generators in energy balancing markets. As in traditional generation markets, storage may
have opportunities to exert market power, justifying analysis of strategic behavior in these
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Figure 4: Total firm profits under energy and capacity pricing for γ2 = 0.5.
new markets. Price and capacity competition is a game theoretic model of strategic behav-
ior that precisely captures three essential characteristics of storage: hard capacity limits,
dynamically coupled energy states, and low marginal costs. Using our new results on price
and capacity competition, we obtain the following insights about designing energy balancing
markets with storage.
• Energy pricing leads to lower, randomized prices and lower capacity commitments.
Capacity pricing leads to higher, consistent prices and higher capacity commitments.
These two formats represent opposing extremes of possible market designs, which may
have both energy and capacity payments. Choosing how much to pay for energy versus
capacity is therefore a tradeoff between economically efficient pricing with low capacity
commitment and robust capacity commitment with high prices. Despite the fact that,
as discussed in Section 2.1, high prices in our model are the result of strategic behavior,
capacity pricing may nevertheless be useful when the objective is to encourage invest-
ment in storage and its participation in balancing markets. Likewise, energy pricing
may be well-suited to maintaining the competitiveness of markets with established
participants.
• Longer market horizons and lower leakage (and, by proxy, higher physical efficiency)
both reduce gaming by inducing firms to compete to be cycled more frequently by
lowering their prices (under energy pricing). The benefits of a longer horizon are easily
obtainable because equilibrium prices converge rapidly with horizon length.
We now discuss some relevant future research directions. First, we believe that there are
many additional questions that could be addressed with the framework in this paper, for
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instance the effect of temporal correlations in the energy imbalances, and sequences of non-
zero mean energy imbalances. Since we have assumed a discriminatory payment mechanism,
it is of interest and would likely be a similar theoretical exercise to characterize a game
based on a uniform-price payment mechanism. Barrier to entry is another important market
feature; however, this would likely be more difficult to analyze because it entails a non-trivial
extension of our framework to the n-firm case. Models in which price and capacity are bid
simultaneously or in which hybrid payments are made for both price and capacity may be
a better match for real markets, but may be harder to analyze because each firm’s strategy
space will be two-dimensional. Finally, a dynamic stochastic game framework like that of
[45] could enable the analysis of sequences of markets with price and capacity bidding.
Appendix
Proof. (Lemma 1). We show that a mixed strategy equilibrium exists in the pricing game.
Existence for a single period when B is not random is proved in Prop. 4.3 [2] using Theorem
5 of [21]. We may straightforwardly adapt their approach to the present scenario. Let
πˆ(p) =
∑N
i=1 πi(p). For each firm i, let Gi ∈ N. For each G with 0 ≤ G ≤ Gi and j 6= i,
1 ≤ j ≤ N , let gGij be a one-to-one continuous function. Let Pˆ (i) be defined as
Pˆ (i) =
{
p | ∃ j 6= i, ∃ G, 0 ≤ G ≤ Gi s.t. pj = g
G
ij(pi)
}
.
Theorem 5 in [21] is as follows:
Theorem 2. Suppose that πi(pi, p−i) is bounded, continuous in p except on a subset P
∗ of
Pˆ (i), and weakly lower semicontinuous in pi for all i, and that πˆ(p) is upper semicontinuous
in p. Then a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists.
Using the argument in [2, 1], it can be shown that πi(p) is bounded, continuous in p
except at a subset P ∗, and weakly lower semicontinuous when B is deterministic. All of
these properties are preserved by taking the expectation over B and thus hold for πi(p)
when B is random. Clearly, πˆ(p) is continuous as well since it is the sum of continuous
functions. This establishes the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Proof. (Lemma 2). We proceed case-wise as in the lemma.
1. Let i = argmax
j
pj and suppose pi > 0, If i is not a strict maximum, profits can
be made through undercutting, so we assume that it is a strict maximum. Then
E
[∑T
t=0 |X
t
i (p)|
]
= 0, and thus a profitable deviation exists to pi − ǫ for some ǫ > 0.
Since pi is maximal and a deviation exists if it is positive, the pure strategy equilibrium
must be pj = 0 for all j.
2. Since the allocation to each firm is independent of the price vector in this case, the
pure strategy equilibrium is for each firm to set the maximum price, pi = R.
The following technical result is necessary for the proof of Lemma 3.
Lemma 7.
∑T
t=0 |X
t
i (p)| is nonincreasing in pi and nondecreasing in p−i.
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Observe that
∑T
t=0 |X
t
i (p)| only increases or decreases when the price-wise ordering of
the firms changes, because otherwise the allocation (1)-(3) is unaffected. Since Lemma 7
holds for any realization of the imbalance sequence B, it implies that E
[∑T
t=0 |X
t
i (p)|
]
is
nonincreasing in pi and nondecreasing in p−i as well.
Proof. (Lemma 7). Suppose that pj is the smallest price larger than pi, and consider an
increase in pi to pi + ǫ, ǫ < 0. If pi + ǫ < pj, then
∑T
t=0 |X
t
i (p)| does not change. Assume
that pi + ǫ > pj . We proceed inductively.
Without loss of generality, assume B0 ≥ 0. By construction, |S1i (p) − S
1
i (p−i, pi +
ǫ)| = |X 0i (p)| − |X
0
i (p−i, pi + ǫ)| ≥ 0, which establishes the base case. Now assume that∑k
t=0 |X
t
i (p)| −
∑k
t=0 |X
t
i (p−i, pi + ǫ)| ≥
∣∣Sk+1i (p)− Sk+1i (p−i, pi + ǫ)∣∣. Without loss of gener-
ality, assume that Bk+1 > 0 and thus X k+1i (p) ≥ 0 and X
k+1
i (p−i, pi+ ǫ) ≥ 0. First, consider
the case that X k+1i (p)− X
k+1
i (p−i, pi + ǫ) ≤ 0. This implies S
k+1
i (p)− S
k+1
i (p−i, pi + ǫ) ≥ 0
because Sk+1i (p) = Si. By assumption, we then have
k+1∑
t=0
∣∣X ti (p)∣∣−
k+1∑
t=0
∣∣X ti (p−i, pi + ǫ)∣∣ ≥ αi ∣∣Sk+1i (p)− Sk+1i (p−i, pi + ǫ)∣∣
+
∣∣X k+1i (p)∣∣− ∣∣X k+1i (p−i, pi + ǫ)∣∣
= αiS
k+1
i (p)− αiS
k+1
i (p−i, pi + ǫ)
+X k+1i (p)−X
k+1
i (p−i, pi + ǫ)
=
∣∣Sk+2i (p)− Sk+2i (p−i, pi + ǫ)∣∣ ,
where the last line is due to (4) and the fact that
∣∣X k+1i (p−i, pi + ǫ)∣∣−∣∣X k+1i (p)∣∣ ≤ αi ∣∣Sk+1i (p)− Sk+1i (p−i, pi + ǫ)∣∣
due to the capacity limit.
Now assume that that X k+1i (p)−X
k+1
i (p−i, pi + ǫ) ≥ 0. Then
k+1∑
t=0
∣∣X ti (p)∣∣− k+1∑
t=0
∣∣X ti (p−i, pi + ǫ)∣∣ ≥ αi ∣∣Sk+1i (p)− Sk+1i (p−i, pi + ǫ)∣∣
+
∣∣X k+1i (p)∣∣− ∣∣X k+1i (p−i, pi + ǫ)∣∣
= αi
∣∣Sk+1i (p)− Sk+1i (p−i, pi + ǫ)∣∣
+
∣∣X k+1i (p)− X k+1i (p−i, pi + ǫ)∣∣
≥
∣∣αiSk+1i (p) + X k+1i (p)
−αiS
k+1
i (p−i, pi + ǫ)−X
k+1
i (p−i, pi + ǫ)
∣∣
=
∣∣Sk+2i (p)− Sk+2i (p−i, pi + ǫ)∣∣ ,
where the third line is due to the triangle inequality. Since
∣∣Sk+2i (p)− Sk+2i (p−i, pi + ǫ)∣∣ ≥
0, we have by induction that
∑k
t=0 |X
t
i (p)| −
∑k
t=0 |X
t
i (p−i, pi + ǫ)| ≥ 0 for all k, which
establishes the desired result that
∑T
t=0 |X
t
i (p)| is nonincreasing in pi.∑T
t=0 |X
t
i (p)| can be shown to be nondecreasing in p−i by reducing some pj , j 6= i, by
ǫ > 0 and repeating the above argument.
Proof. (Lemma 3). The proof is a straightforward extension of the approach of [1] to the
case of random demand over multiple time periods. We first state several standard facts
from game theory (see, e.g., [44]). Let Ui and Li be the upper and lower boundaries of the
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support of µi. By the definition of mixed-strategy equilibrium, there exists a π
∗
i and a subset
Pi ⊆ [Li, Ui], µi(Pi) = 1 for which
πi(pi, µ−i) ≤ π
∗
i ∀ pi ∈ [Ui, Li] (13)
πi(pi, µ−i) = π
∗
i ∀ pi ∈ Pi (14)
This means that there may be a few locations, e.g., a finite number of discrete points, inside
[Ui, Li] but not Pi at which πi(pi, µ−i) ≤ π
∗
i . The payoff πi(pi, µ−i) is continuous at pi if µ−i
and has no atom there (µi has an atom at pi ∈ [Li, Ui] if Prob(pi) = a > 0, or, equivalently,
µi(x) = aδ(x−pi), where δ(x) is the Dirac delta function). Therefore, πi(pi, µ−i) = π
∗
i if µ−i
has no atom at pi.
We now prove each point of the lemma sequentially.
1. First suppose that µi(p) = 0 for all i and all pi ∈ [p, p], Lj < p < p < Uj for at least one
firm j. Then from p to p ∈ (p, p) is a profitable deviation for any firm with probability
mass below p. Now suppose that only one firm i has µi(p) > 0 for pi ∈ [p, p]. Then the
distribution
µ′i(p) =


µi(p) if pi < p
0 if p ≤ pi < p
µ
(
[p, p]
)
if pi = p
µi(p) if pi > p
is a profitable deviation for i; essentially, all of firm i’s probability mass in [p, p] has been
shifted to p. Thus at least two firms i must have µi(p) > 0 for all j with pi ∈ [Lj , Uj].
2. First we show that no two firms may have an atom at the same location. Suppose
multiple firms have an atom at p′. Then with positive probability all such firms set
pi = p
′. For a given firm i, there exists an ǫ > 0 small enough that πi(p
′ − ǫ, µ−i) >
πi(p
′, µ−i), a profitable deviation for firm i.
We now show that no firm can have an atom in [L, U). Suppose firm i has an atom
at p. If p /∈ [Lj , Uj) for all j 6= i, then p + ǫ, ǫ > 0 is a profitable deviation for firm i.
Now assume firm i has an atom of mass a ∈ (0, 1] at p′ ∈ (Lj , Uj) for some j 6= i, and
let µˆ denote µ with the atom subtracted off. Consider the difference between firm j’s
profits at p′ − ǫ and p′ + ǫ:
πj (p
′ − ǫ, µ−j)− πj (p
′ + ǫ, µ−j) =
(p′ − ǫ)
[∫
p−j
(∏
k 6=j
µˆk(pk)
)
E
[
T∑
t=0
∣∣X tj (p′ − ǫ, p−j)∣∣
]
dp
+ a
∫
p−i,j
(∏
k 6=i,j
µˆk(pk)
)
E
[
T∑
t=0
∣∣X tj (p′ − ǫ, p′, p−i,j)∣∣
]
dp
]
− (p′ + ǫ)
[∫
p−j
(∏
k 6=j
µˆk(pk)
)
E
[
T∑
t=0
∣∣X tj (p′ + ǫ, p−j)∣∣
]
dp
+ a
∫
p−i,j
(∏
k 6=i,j
µˆk(pk)
)
E
[
T∑
t=0
∣∣X tj (p′ + ǫ, p′, p−i,j)∣∣
]
dp
]
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Letting ǫ tend to zero, the first and third terms cancel, while the sum of the remaining
terms remains positive because
∑T
t=0
∣∣X tj (p)∣∣ (by Lemma 7) and hence E [∑Tt=0 ∣∣X tj (p)∣∣]
are nonincreasing in pj . Since firm j has no atom at p
′ − ǫ or p′ + ǫ for some ǫ, its
strategy is continuous at p′ + ǫ and πj (p
′ + ǫ, µ−j) = π
∗
j . But p
′ − ǫ is a profitable
deviation from p′ + ǫ for firm j, establishing that an atom can only exist at U .
3. Suppose U < R. First consider the case that a firm, i, has an atom at U . Then
πi(R, µ−i) > πi(U, µ−i), and a profitable deviation exists. Now suppose no firm has an
atom at U . Then similarly for any firm i with upper support U , πi(R, µ−i) > πi(U, µ−i),
establishing the existence of a profitable deviation.
Proof. (Theorem 1). Let Υi be the cumulative distribution of firm i’s mixed-strategy. Since,
by Lemma 3, neither firm has an atom in [L,R), we have that
π∗1 = x
(∫ x
L
µ2(p2)E
[
T∑
t=0
∣∣X t1(x, p2)∣∣
]
dp2 +
∫ R
x
µ2(p2)E
[
T∑
t=0
∣∣X t1(x, p2)∣∣
]
dp2
)
= x
(
X 1
∫ x
L
µ2(p2)dp2 + X 1
∫ R
x
µ2(p2)dp2
)
= x
(
X 1Υ2(x) + X 1(1−Υ2(x))
)
.
Solving for Υ2(x) over [L,R), we have
Υ2(x) =
X 1
X 1 − X 1
−
π∗1(
X 1 −X 1
)
x
.
By the same argument, we similarly have
Υ1(x) =
X 2
X 2 − X 2
−
π∗2(
X 2 −X 2
)
x
,
also over [L,R).
From Lemma 3, only one firm can have an atom at R. If S1 = S2, they are interchange-
able. Assume now that S1 > S2 and that X 1 ≥ X 2 and X 1 ≥ X 2. Suppose for the sake of
contradiction that firm two, which has smaller capacity, has an atom at R. Then, since firm
one cannot have an atom at R,
π∗2 = RX 2
π∗1 =
RX 2X 1
X 2
Subbing π(C,R, S) into the above expression for Υ2(R), we have
Υ2(R) =
X 1
X 1 −X 1
−
X 2X 1
X 2
(
X 1 −X 1
)
>
X 1
X 1 −X 1
−
X 2X 1
X 1
(
X 1 −X 1
) (because X 1 > X 2)
=
X 1 −X 2
X 1 −X 1
> 1 (because X 1 > X 2).
This contradicts the assumption that µ2 has an atom at R. Therefore, the equilibrium
payoffs are
π∗1 = RX 1
π∗2 =
RX 1X 2
X 1
Now setting Υ2(L) = 0, we have that L = RX 1/X 1. The atom at R in the large firm’s
strategy can be shown to be
X 2X 1 − X 2X 1
X 1
(
X 2 − X 2
)
The mixed strategies, can be obtained by substituting the above into Υi(x) and differen-
tiating.
Proof. (Lemma 5). The second derivative of π(Si, S−i)−γiSi with respect to Si is −Rf(Si+
S−i), and hence it is strictly concave because f is positive. Since π(S−i, Si) is also differ-
entiable, it suffices for quasiconcavity to show that its first derivative with respect to Si is
initially positive and crosses zero exactly once [11]. Let Si =
∫ Si
0
Bf(B)dB + Si(1− F (Si)).
The first derivative is given by
dπ(S−i, Si)
dSi
=
1
S−i
[
(1− F (Si))π(S−i, Si) +R (F (Si)− F (Si + S−i))Si
]
(15)
where Si =
∫∞
0
min(Si, D)f(D)dD. Dividing through by Si, define
M(Si) =
(1− F (Si))π(S−i, Si)
Si
N(Si) = R (F (Si)− F (Si + S−i))
π(S−i, Si) is equal to zero at Si = 0 and Si =∞ but is not constantly zero. Therefore, by the
mean value theorem, (15) is zero at least once in between, which implies thatM(Si)+N(Si) =
0 at any such point.
Observe that M(Si) is always positive and N(Si) always negative. One may straight-
forwardly differentiate to see that the magnitude of (1 − F (Si)) shrinks faster than that of
(F (Si)−F (Si+S−i)) as Si increases; since the fraction
pi(S−i,Si)
Si
also approaches zero with Si,
we may conclude that the magnitude of M(Si) shrinks faster than that of N(Si). Since the
magnitudes are identical at any point S ′i whereM(S
′
i)+N(S
′
i) = 0, thenM(S
′′
i )+N(S
′′
i ) < 0
for any S ′′i > S
′
i. Therefore (15) is zero at only one finite value, henceforth denoted S
′
i, es-
tablishing the quasiconcavity of π(S−i, Si) with respect to Si.
Because the magnitude ofM(Si) shrinks faster than that of N(Si),
dpi
dS2
(S−i, Si) is strictly
decreasing in Si prior to crossing zero. Since −γi is negative and constant,
dpi(S−i,Si)
dSi
− γi
is also strictly decreasing in Si before crossing zero and then remains negative, implying
quasiconcavity of π(S−i, Si)− γ−iS−i with respect to Si.
Proof. (Theorem 6). We prove that Sˆi are the only possible pure-strategy equilibria by
showing that an equilibrium can only exist where ψi has zero slope in Si. This is equivalent
to showing that no ‘ridges’ exist in ψi. A sufficient condition is
dπ (S−i, Si)
dSi
∣∣∣∣
Si=S−i
≤
dπ (Si, S−i)
dSi
∣∣∣∣
Si=S−i
. (16)
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We have that
dπ (S−i, Si)
dSi
∣∣∣∣
S−i=Si
= (1− F (Si))
π (Si, Si)
Si
+R (F (Si)− F (2Si))
≤ R (1− F (Si)) +R (F (Si)− F (2Si))
= R (1− F (2Si))
=
dπ (Si, S−i)
dSi
∣∣∣∣
S−i=Si
,
establishing the claim.
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